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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--FREEDOM OF
SPEECH-OBSCENITY STATUrES.
Although it was an indictable offense at common law to publish or
print an obscene book,' to distribute obscene printed matter,2 or to exhibit
obscene pictures, 3 legislation making these acts a crime has been enacted
in all jurisdictions but two. 4 There has been bitter and voluminous
criticism of all such obscenity laws on the ground that such limitations on
the free expression of ideas engenders greater evils than those which the
statutes purport to remedy.5 Though we are guaranteed freedom of speech
and press by the first amendment, the United States Supreme Court, by
way of dicta, has always assumed that obscenity does not come within the
safeguards of this amendment. 6 This dicta has become law in the recent
decision of Roth v. United States 7 where the Court upheld, as constitu-
tional, both the federal obscenity statute and the obscenity provisions of the
California Penal Code.8 It is not the purpose of this Comment to deal with
the entire field of obscenity, but rather with obscenity in the field of liter-
ature. We will examine obscenity statutes in general, then specifically the
various tests which have been used in determining whether certain printed
matter is obscene, and finally the merits of such statutes.
1. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821).
2. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945).
3. State v. Pfenninger, 76 Mo. App. 313 (1898).
4. H. R. REP. No. 2410, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). Alaska and New Mexico are
the two exceptions.
5. See SCHROEDER, OBSCENE LITERATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 416 (1911);
Alpert, Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARv. L. Rzv. 40 (1938); Morton,
Our Foolish Obscenity Laws, 23 CASE & CoM. 23 (1916).
6. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938);
Near v. Minnesota 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
7. 77 Sup. Ct. 1304 (1957).
8. The federal obscenity statute provided in pertinent part: "Every obscene, lewd,
lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other pub-
lication of an indecent character . . . is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall
not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter car-
rier. . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1952). The California Penal Code provides in pertinent
part: "Every person who wilfully and lewdly: ... Writes, composes, stereotypes,
prints, publishes, sells, distributes, keeps for sale, or exhibits any obscene or indecent
writing, paper, or book . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor. CAL. PEN. CODE ANN.
§ 311 (West 1955).
(71)
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I.
OBSCENITY STATUTES IN GENERAL.
Statutes today make it an offense to sell, 9 to have in possession with
intent to sell,1 or lend,'1 or to publish 12 obscene literature. In deter-
mining whether the statute satisfies the minimum constitutional require-
ments of definiteness and certainty, it has been held that the word "obscene"
is sufficiently definite.13 In formulating obscenity statutes, some legislators
use words other than the word "obscene", but it has been generally ac-
cepted that the terms "sexual impurity", 14 "moral corruption", 15 and "the
stimulation of lustful and lecherous desires", 16 are synonymous and co-
extensive in their relation to obscenity.
When material is alleged to be obscene, it is a question of fact for the
jury to determine whether or not it is obscene. 17 The jury in some states
may take into account the probable readers of the book and whether the
book adversely affects a substantial proportion of its readers.' 8 The tradi-
tional rule is that the opinions of literary critics are not admissible as evi-
dence since the issue is one which the jury is as qualified to determine as
the expert. 19 However, some courts do admit such "expert" opinion, rea-
soning that such evidence is rationally helpful to the jury.2° A book which
possesses literary or artistic merit, 21 or sincerity of purpose 22 may be
obscene. However, a book is not rendered obscene merely because of its
subject matter, that is, because of coarse scenes or because it contains
occasional and incidental references to sexual contacts,23 or because of the
choice of language which is considered to be foul, coarse or vulgar.
2 4
However, all of these are proper factors to be considered by the jury.
9. CAL. PXN. CoDm ANN. § 311 (3) (West 1955).
10. N.Y. PSN. LAW § 1141 (1).
11. MAss. GZN. LAWS C.272, § 28 (1932).
12. CAL. PxN. Cone ANN. § 311 (West 1955).
13. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); People v. Wendling, 258 N.Y. 451,
180 N.E. 169 (1932).
14. Burstein v. United States, 178 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1949).
15. United States v. Two Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
16. Attorney General v. Book Named "Serenade", 326 Mass. 324, 94 N.E.2d 259
(1950).
17. United States v. Two Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Cal. 1951);
People v. Brainard, 192 App. Div. 816, 183 N.Y. Supp. 452 (1st Dep't 1920).
18. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945).
19. United States v. Two Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Cal. 1951)
Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945) ; People v. Seltzer,
122 Misc. 329, 203 N.Y. Supp. (Sup. Ct. 1924).
20. United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses", 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934);
People ex rel Kahan v. Creative Age Press, 192 Misc. 188, 79 N.Y.S.2d 198 (N.Y.
Magis. Ct. 1948).
21. People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P.2d 853 (1947).
22. Attorney General v. Book Named "Forever Amber", 323 Mass. 302, 81 N.E.
2d 663 (1948).
23. People ex rel Kahan v. Creative Age Press, 192 Misc. 188, 79 N.Y.S.2d 198
(N.Y. Magis. Ct. 1948).
24. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945).
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In addition to making it a crime to sell and distribute matter found to
be obscene, some statutes authorize the chief executive or legal officer of a
municipality to obtain an injunction against the sale and distribution of
written and printed matter found, after due trial, to be obscene, and to
obtain an order for the seizure, in default of surrender, of the condemned
publications. 25
Although obscenity statutes have been upheld by the courts, they may
not make it a crime to make available for the general reading public a book
containing obscene language tending to incite minors to violent or depraved
or immoral acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of
youth. 26 Such a statute unconstitutionally restricts freedom of speech by
reducing the adult population to reading only what is fit for children when
the book relates to sex in any way.
II.
TESTS FOR OBSCENITY.
In handling an obscenity case, the courts struggle to reach a balance
between the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and literary
expression, and the necessity of safeguarding the moral code as it is estab-
lished in the community. It is for this reason they have formulated tests
for determining whether certain matter is obscene. Some of these tests
have not stood the test of time.
The earliest test of obscenity comes from the English court in 1868
in the case of Regina v. Hicklinr.2 7 There, Lord Cockburn's test was
"whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave and
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into
whose hands publications of this sort may fall." Thus, we see that the
essentials of this test are (a) that the "matter charged as obscene" may be
a passage, chapter, picture or any part of the literary work, and (b) the
"tendency" of which is to "corrupt" the morally weak. This test was ap-
proved in our federal courts in 1879 when a book entitled Cupid's Yoke
or the Binding Forces of Conjugal Life, which dealt with the sex side of
marriage, was declared to be obscene.2 8  Although our courts used this
broad test, they were quick to measure the classics with a yardstick which
was not brought into use for contemporary creations. Thus, in one judicial
decision, Payne's edition of the Arabian Nights, Fieldling's Tom Jones, the
works of Rabelais, Ovid's Art of Love, the Decameron of Boccacio, the
Heptaineron of Queen Margaret of Navarre, and Alladin were held not to
be obscene since they were the product of the greatest literary geniuses,
and had so long held a supreme rank in literature that it would be absurd
25. Kingsley Books Inc. v. Brown, 77 Sup. Ct. 1325 (1957).
26. Butler v. Michigan, 77 Sup. Ct. 524 (1957).
27. Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 Q.B. 360.
28. United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, No. 14571 (S.D.N.Y. 1879).
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to call them now foul and unclean.23 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, however, used the Hicklin test in declaring obscene
Theodore Dreiser's An American Tragedy 30 and Erskine Caldwell's God's
Little Acre a1 -contemporary works which are considered to be of con-
siderable literary stature.3 2
In time the courts realized that the Hicklin test was too strict and
unrealistic to be applied. By it the most intelligent and educated members
of the community would be reduced to the same plane as their most mentally
immature neighbors. The reductio ad absurdum of the test was that by it
even the Bible could be declared obscene. 3 However, by 1913 the Hicklin
test had become so well established that even those judges who personally
rejected it felt obliged to follow it. Thus, Judge Learned Hand in the
case of United States v. Kennerly,34 although he used the Hicklin test,
protested against it, saying that the literature of a community should not be
determined by the most corruptible and weakest members of society, and
suggested that the test should be broadened to allow that which is honestly
relevant to an adequate expression of ideas. Judge Learned Hand's senti-
ments were later implemented in the case of United States v. One Book
Called "Ulysses".3 5 There the court refused to apply the Hicklin test to
declare James Joyce's book Ulysses obscene. In his book Joyce, seeking a
new means of literary expression, attempted to depict the thoughts and lay
bare the souls of a number of people with a realism that leaves nothing
unsaid. The court recognized that the book contained erotic passages
(which under the Hicklin test would condemn it as'obscene), but refused
to declare it obscene because they were so submerged that the dominant
effect produced on reading Ulysses was not one of lust, and also because
the depictions were sincere, truthful, relevant to the subject, and executed
with real art. In a later opinion Judge Learned Hand expressly stated
that the Hicklin test had been overruled by the Ulysses case.8 6 Thereafter,
new tests were formulated by the state courts. The test used today in
California in determining obscenity is: whether the material considered
as a whole has a substantive tendency to deprave or corrupt readers by
exciting lascivious thoughts or arousing lustful desires.37 A test used in
the New York courts is:
"Whether or not, recognizing the latitude afforded all works of
literature and of art, and that tastes may differ, a reasonable, cautious
29. In re Worthington Co., 62 N.Y. St. Rep. 115, 30 N.Y. Supp. 361 (Sup. Ct.
1894).
30. Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930).
31. Attorney General v. Book Named "God's Little Acre", 326 Mass. 281, 93
N.E.2d 819 (1950).
32. Note, 28 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 877 (1953).
33. State v. Lerner, 81 N.E.2d 282, 289 (Ohio 1948).
34. 209 Fed. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
35. 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
36. United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936).
37. People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P.2d 853 (1947).
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and prudent man environed with the conditions of life as they exist
today, and not in some past age, would be justified in believing that
the book was obscene and lewd, not in certain passages, but in its main
purposes and construction, and published for no useful purpose but
simply from a desire to cater to the lowest and most sensual part of
human nature." 38
Although there is neither time nor space to state the tests used in
every state, it suffices to say that they are similar in that the book must
be considered as a whole and not by isolated passages, and it must tend
to excite lustful thoughts. (But under the California test it would also
have to have a substantive tendency to deprave or corrupt its readers.)
The Ohio legislature recently attempted to bring back the Hicklin test
by making it a crime to knowingly sell or publish an obscene, lewd or
lascivious book, paper or magazine not wholly obscene, but containing lewd
or lascivious articles, advertisements or representations of an indecent or
immoral nature3 9 However, the Ohio Supreme Court held the statute
unconstitutional as invading the field reserved to the press beyond what is
reasonably necessary to effect the object of the statute.4 The court stated
that in testing for obscenity the book must be viewed in its entirety, and
only when and if the "obscene" contents constitute the dominant feature
or effect does the book fall within the forbidden class.
The United States Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. United
States41 used the definition of obscenity formulated in the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6 1957),
which is: "A thing is obscene if considered as a whole, its predominant
appeal is to prurient interest." Using this definition the test the Court
applied was: whether to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest. The dictionary defines prurient as follows:
"Itching; uneasy with desire or longing; of persons having itching, morbid,
or lascivious longings." 42 Thus the essential element-material appealing
to prurient interest-used in its definition and test of obscenity mean
material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts. Therefore, the test
used in the Roth case is practically the same as the tests used in other
states today.43
38, People v. Gotham Book Mart Inc., 158 Misc. 240, 285 N.Y. Supp. 563 (N.Y.
Magis. Ct. 1936).
39. OHIo REv. CODSm ANN. § 13035 (Baldwin 1948).
40. State v. Lerner, 81 N.E.2d 282 (Ohio 1948). Although we pointed out that
in the federal courts, the Hicklin test had been overruled by the Ulysses case, it was
not declared unconstitutional. However, in the Roth case the Supreme Court expressly
states that the test is unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedom of speech and press.
41. 77 Sup. Ct. 1304 (1957).
42. WEBSTER, Nrw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1949).
43. This is so even though, as Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion (in part)
points out, the drafters of the definition of obscenity contained in the American Law
COMMENTS
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III...
MERITS OF THE STATUTES.
Our right to freedom of speech is protected against federal encroach-
ment by the first amendment and against state encroachment by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.44 However, the right of free
speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. As we have
seen, obscene speech is not within the protection of these amendments. 45
However, the term "obscene speech" is very general and applies not only
to literature, but to art, movies and comic books as well. Although the
soundness of obscenity statutes dealing with art, movies and comic books
is not questioned here, in the field of literature the obscenity statutes do not
appear to be reasonably related to the evil they are meant to prevent, and
appear to unreasonably infringe upon freedom of expression.
Obscenity statutes were passed by the states under their police power
in order to protect the public welfare. They were passed to combat the
great increase in juvenile delinquency and sexual misconduct. 46  It was
(and is) believed that there was a direct causal connection between sexual
misconduct by juveniles and the arousing of sexual desires 47 by the reading
of obscene literature. However, from our research there appears to be no
dependable evidence or information as to such effects of obscene literature
to warrant such a conclusion.
Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, who are among the country's leading
authorities on juvenile delinquency, have recently published the results of a
ten year study of its causes.48 They exhaustively studied approximately
Institute's Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 6 intended to change the prevailing
test of obscenity. This intention is shown in the Comment following § 207.10 (2) which
states:
"Obscenity [in the tentative draft] is defined in terms of material which
appeals predominantly to prurient interest in sexual matters and which goes
beyond customary freedom of expression in these matters. We reject the prevail-
ing test of tendency to arouse lustful thoughts or desires because it is unrealis-
tically broad for a society that plainly tolerates a great deal of erotic interest in
literature, advertising, and art, and because regulation of thought or desire, un-
connected with overt misbehavior, raises the most acute constitutional as well
as practical difficulties. We likewise reject the common definition of obscene as
that which tends to corrupt or debase. If this means anything different from
tendency to arouse lustful thought and desire, it suggests that change of character
or actual misbehavior follows from contact with obscenity. Evidence of such
consequence is lacking . . . on the other hand appeal to prurient interest refers
to qualities of the material itself: the capacity to attract individuals eager for
a forbidden book."
In the majority opinion, the definitions in Webster's dictionary have prevailed
over the intention of the drafters of the new code. See Roth v. United States, 77
Sup. Ct. 1304 (1957).
44. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
45. Roth v. United States, 77 Sup. Ct. 1304 (1957).
46. Burke v. Kingsley Books Inc., 208 Misc. 150, 142 N.Y.S. 2d 735 (Sup. Ct.
1955).
47. By sexual desires are meant those desires which an average, normal person
would consider to be sexual and not what certain psychologists consider to be sexual
desires. For example, Sigmund Freud considered the desire of a little boy to be with
his mother to be a sexual desire. This is not within our meaning of the term.
48. SHELDON AND ELEANOR GLJECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1950).
[VOL. 3 : p. 71
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90 factors and influences that might lead to or explain juvenile delin-
quency.49 However, the Gluecks gave no consideration to the type of read-
ing material, if any, read by the delinquents. This is consistent with their
finding that delinquents read very little, as the delinquents are generally
the adventurous type who have little use for reading and other non-active
entertainment." When those who know so much about the problem of
delinquency among youth-the very group about whom the advocates of
censorship are most concerned-conclude that what delinquents read has
so little effect upon. their conduct that it is not worth investigating in an
exhaustive study of causes, there is good reason for serious doubt con-
cerning the basic hypothesis on which obscenity censorship is defended.5 1
The many other influences in society that stimulate sexual desire are
so much more frequent in their influence, and so much more potent in their
effect, that the influence of reading is likely, at most, to be relatively in-
significant in the composite of forces that lead an individual into conduct
deviating from the community sex standards. 52 The Kinsey studies show
the minor degree to which literature serves as a potent sexual stimulant.53
And the studies demonstrating that sex knowledge seldom results from
reading indicate the relative unimportance of literature in sex thoughts as
compared with other factors in society.54
Since under most obscenity statutes a conviction is had if it is proven
that the book tends to stir sexual impulses and leads to sexually impure
thoughts, punishment is inflicted for thoughts provoked and not for overt
acts nor antisocial conduct. This test cannot be reconciled with other deci-
sions under the first and fourteenth amendments.5 5 Although the "clear
and present danger" test in regard to some substantive evil is no longer used
before freedom of speech is curtailed,5 6 in order to punish it in the field of
politics it must have a tendency of bringing about some substantive evil
49. For a quick summary of the broad scope of the study, listing all the factors
investigated, see the table of contents, id. at xiv, xv.
50. Id. at 160, 161.
51. See Lockhart and McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity and the Consti-
tution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295, 386 (1954) commenting on the Gluecks' research.
52. Ibid.
53. See KINSEY, POMEROY, MARTIN AND GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
HUMAN FEMALE 669, 670 (1953).
54. Alpert, Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1938).
55. Roth v. United States, 77 Sup. Ct. 1304 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
56. However, Judge Bok in the case of Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. &
C. 101 (Phila. 1949) aff'd sub nom Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum 166 Pa. Super. 120,
70 A.2d 389 (1950), held that the state obscenity statute could be applied only where
there is a reasonable and demonstrable cause to believe that a crime or misdemeanor
has been committed or is about to be committed as the result of the publication and
distribution of the writing in question: the opinion of anyone that a tendency thereto
exists or that such a result is self-evident is insufficient. This case has not been fol-
lowed elsewhere and was ignored in a later Pennsylvania case which upheld a con-
viction for the violation of an obscenity statute. The test used in the later case was:
"whether the writing would tend to deprave the morals of those into whose hands
the publications might fall by suggesting lewd thoughts and exciting sensual desires."
Commonwealth v. Donaducy, 167 Pa. Super. 611, 76 A.2d 440 (1950).
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which the legislature has attempted to prevent.5 7 If, in the field of politics
there must be a tendency to bring about some action, then in the field of
obscenity it should not be sufficient to provoke just thoughts alone.5 s
As the law stands today, the contemporary writer of fiction is the
object of discrimination due to the immunization of the recognized classics
from the field of obscenity. Not only must he compete with the reputation
of the ancient writers, but his source of material is limited, since certain
areas available to his predecessors have been withdrawn by the law of
obscenity. Thus a work so permeated with sex such as Boccacio's De-
cameron remains in the non-obscene class, whereas, if a contemporary
writer would produce such a work it would almost certainly be declared
obscene. If, as the authorities tell us, literature has such a very small
relation to sexual misconduct,5 9 it would seem unjust to so restrict the areas
available to contemporary writers. They, too, should have an equal chance
to create a classical work.
The theme of this Comment has not been to give the impression that
obscene literature should be allowed to circulate freely among the public.
Nor do we find it shocking that the Supreme Court has declared that
obscenity is not protected speech within the first and fourteenth amend-
ments.60 However, we do find fault with the tests used by the courts in
determining whether or not a book is obscene. To say that because a book
tends to stir sexual impulses and leads to sexually impure thoughts, it is
therefore obscene and to be condemned is unreasonable. Many well-
written books, written with the highest intentions, can too easily come with
this test as there are many commonly used words which tend to excite
sexual thoughts; and whether or not these thoughts are impure will depend
upon how the reader accepts them. It is not our purpose to propose a new
test, but some distinction must be made between a work which merely tends
to excite sexual thoughts, even if they be impure, and a work which treats
or describes sex in such a low and debasing manner as to be nothing more
than an exploitation of that which is sexually impure. As to the latter, it
should certainly be prohibited.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
Although the great increase in juvenile delinquency and sexual mis-
conduct is a suitable field for legislative action, our investigation has shown
that obscenity statutes in the field of literature as they are enforced today,
are not a suitable means of alleviating that problem. Today's tests for
determining obscenity are unrealistically broad for a society that plainly
57. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
58. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, Comments, at .20 (Tent. Draft No. 6
1957).
59. Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity and the Constitution,
38 MINN. L. Rev. 295 (1954).
60. Roth v. United States, 77 Sup. Ct. 1304 (1957).
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tolerates a great deal of erotic interest in literature, advertising and art.61
And since there is no clear proof of any substantial connection between
obscene literature (as defined today), juvenile delinquency, and sexual mis-
conduct, it seems clearly unconstitutional to regulate thoughts or desires
provoked in the reader, which are unconnected with any overt misbehavior
by him. A new test must be formulated; one which goes beyond condemn-
ing a work merely because it tends to stir sexual impulses and leads to
sexually impure thoughts. The modern tests of obscenity may rightfully
suppress a cheap tract today but can easily suppress a literary gem to-
morrow.6 2 It is for the protection of the latter that a new test for obscenity
must be formulated.
Francis P. Connors.
PROCEDURE-CIvIL ARREST AND EXECUTION AGAINST THE PERSON-
COMPARISON OF NEW JERSEY, NEW YORK
AND PENNSYLVANIA LAW.
The scope of this Comment is necessarily restricted, since the remedies
of civil arrest and execution against the person, though not often resorted
to, have many ramifications, treatment of which is prohibitive in less than
a complete volume. An attempt is made here to compile the provisions of
the New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania constitutions and statutes
relating to arrest and execution against the person, and to cite examples
of their application. A comparison of these provisions will be made, with
the advantages and disadvantages being pointed out. The privileges and
exemptions from civil arrest allowed in each of the states are treated
separately. No attempt has been made to treat proceedings for contempt,
since contempt is basically a disobedience to the court's authority, though
also a means of vindicating private rights.1 The procedural means by
which a plaintiff invokes civil arrest and body execution, of course, are
too detailed for treatment, and by the same token the procedural methods
by which the defendant is released from imprisonment are also placed
beyond our scope. Our purpose is to point up what seem to be the
deficiencies in the existing statutes in New Jersey, New York and Penn-
sylvania relating to civil arrest and execution against the person after
judgment.
I.
INTRODUCTION.
Arrest in a civil action has been defined as the apprehension of a person
by civil process to answer the demand against him. 2 It is considered a
61. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, Comment, p. 20 (Tent. Draft No. 6 1957).
62. Roth v. United States, 77 Sup. Ct. 1304 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
1. In re Bozorth, 38 N.J. Super. 184, 118 A.2d 430 (1955).
2. Family Finance Corp. v. Starke, 36 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
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provisional or auxiliary remedy the purpose of which is to bring a defend-
ant within the jurisdiction of the court or to keep him within range of its
final process." Execution against the person is the imprisonment of a
judgment debtor to coerce him into revealing any hidden assets he may
have which can be used to satisfy the judgment creditor's claim.4  New
Jersey law provides for a capias ad respondendum " prior to judgment in
civil actions 6 and for a capias ad satisfaciendum 7 in execution after judg-
ment.8 New York State differentiates between the provisional remedy of
arrest 9 and executions against the person after judgment.10 In Pennsyl-
vania there is no, civil arrest permitted before judgment except in an action
for fines and penalties, upon a writ of ne exeat," and as punishment for
contempt.12 But in these cases a writ of capias ad respondendum, a special
capias,'3 or a warrant of arrest will lie.' 4 There is a writ of capias ad
satisfaciendum provided for in Pennsylvania after judgment,' 5 but it will
not be executed if the judgment against defendant is for less than one
hundred dollars, or if defendant has any real or personal property within
the county sufficient to satisfy the judgment.' 6
The remedy of civil arrest is an extreme one, penal in nature, and not
favored by courts unless necessary to protect the plaintiff's interests.' 7
Statutes allowing civil arrest are not enacted to create imprisonment for
debt, but rather to coerce the defendant into revealing his hidden assets
from which the judgment can be satisfied.' 8  Arrest is to be granted in the
sound discretion of the court.' 9
3. Ibid.
4. Duro Co. v. Wishnevsky, 126 N.J.L. 7, 16 A.2d 64 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
5. A capias ad respondendum has a two-fold purpose in that it notifies defendant
to defend suit and procures his arrest until security for the plaintiff's claim is fur-
nished. Null v. Staiger, 333 Pa. 370, 4 A.2d 883 (1939).
6. N.J. REV. STAT. §§2A:15-41, 15-42 (Supp. 1956).
7. A capias ad satisfaciendtn is a writ whereby the judgment debtor is himself
seized by the sheriff so that the debtor will be coerced into revealing hidden assets.
8. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A :17-78, 17-79 (Supp. 1956).
9. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT §§ 826-846.
10. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT §§ 764-772.
11. This writ may be issued whenever there is a definite equitable debt existing
and due from defendant at the time, and defendant is about to leave the state so that
payment of the debt is liable to be defeated. Lit Bros. v. Rubin, 44 Pa. D. & C. 110
(M.C. Phila. 1942).
12. PA. R. Civ. P. 1481.
13. This special capias ad respondendum may be issued in any personal action
commenced by summons if the plaintiff during the pendency of the action submits to
the court an affidavit that the defendant is about to quit the Commonwealth without
leaving sufficient real or personal property to satisfy plaintiff's claim. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 231 (Supp. 1956).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 171-272 (Supp. 1956).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2142 (Supp. 1956).
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2142b, 2142 (Supp. 1956).
17. Burns v. Newman, 274 App. Div. 301, 83 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1st Dep't 1948).
18. See Duro Co. v. Wishnevsky, 126 N.J.L. 7, 16 A.2d 64 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
19. American Guaranty & Liab. Inc. Co. v. Conran, 140 NY.S.2d 333 (1st Dep't
1955).
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II.
-CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
The constitutions of two of the three states under discussion (New
Jersey and Pennsylvania) have sections expressly prohibiting imprison-
ment for debt, except in cases of fraud.20 The constitution of New York
does not specifically prohibit imprisonment for debt.21 There is a possibility
that an insolvent debtor could avoid arrest by seeking the protection of the
due process clause of New York's constitution, 22 but when a debtor refuses
to pay his just debt even though able to do so he has no recourse to the due
process clause.2
III.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS GOVERNING CIVIL ARREST.
The three states under consideration have various statutes relating
to arrest, and, unfortunately, various ways of dividing the subject. For
convenience here, the topic is divided into arrest in contract actions before
judgment, in tort and other actions before judgment, and execution against
the person after judgment.
New York has several provisions in its Civil Rights Law to make up
for its lack of a constitutional provision governing civil arrest. Section
21 prohibits arrest to enforce a judgment in a contract action unless it is
otherwise specially prescribed by law.2 4 Section 23 is the more general
provision stating that no person shall be arrested in a civil action except
as provided by statute.25 Pennsylvania, in addition to its constitutional
safeguard, has a statute abolishing imprisonment for debt and at the same
time it lists the exceptions to the abolition.26 New Jersey has supple-
mented its constitution by enacting statutes allowing arrest in certain situa-
tions before and after judgment. 27
20. N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 13; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
21. Reeves v. Crownshield, 274 N.Y. 74, 8 N.E.2d 283 (1937).
22. "....
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law." N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
23. Reeves v. Crownshield, 274 N.Y. 74, 8 N.E.2d 283 (1937).
24. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 21.
25. N.Y. Civ. RIGHrs LAW § 23.
26. The statute declares that no person shall be arrested in -any suit instituted to
recover money due upon a judgment. founded upon contract, or. due upon any con-
tract, express or implied, or to recover damages for nonperformance of a contract,
except in proceeding as for contempt to enforce civil remedies, action for fines or pen-
alties, or on promises to marry, on moneys collected by any public officer, or for any
misconduct or neglect in office, or in any professional employment, in which cases the
remedies shall remain as before. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 257 (Supp. 1956). This
statute is now suspended by PA. R. Civ. P. 1481 insofar as it authorizes civil arrest
before judgment, but it still applies to actions for fines and penalties and writs of
ne exeat before judgment, and to execution against the person in some cases afterjudgment.
27..N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-41 to -42, §§ 2A:17-78 to -79 (Supp. 1956).
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A.
Contract Actions Before Judgment.
Both New Jersey and New York allow a civil arrest under certain
circumstances in contract actions. New Jersey distinguishes between the
capias ad respondendum issued as mesne process and the capias ad satis-
faciendum issued in execution upon a judgment previously rendered. The
capias ad respondendum in New Jersey will issue in an action founded on
contract, express or implied, when plaintiff shows either that defendant
is about to remove his property out of the jurisdiction, or that defendant
has assigned or otherwise disposed of his property (or is about to do so),
or that defendant is fraudulently concealing his property or choses in action,
or that defendant fraudulently contracted the debt.28 New York State
allows arrest of a defendant in a contract action on substantially the same
grounds.29 Here Pennsylvania is radically different, for a defendant cannot
be arrested before judgment in any action founded on contract . 0
The New Jersey law provides, inter alia, that a capias ad respondendum
shall issue in an action founded on contract when "defendant fraudulently
contracted the debt or incurred the demand." 31 The usual interpretation
of such statutory language is found in the case of Brune v. Miskind,32 which
held that there must be shown to have existed at the time of the making
of the contract an intent to defraud. A later case went much further in
saying that the words above quoted were broad enough to include those
cases where the resulting fraud, although not shown to have existed
at the time the contract was made, "flows from the contract and becomes
a component part thereof." 3 New York has not gone so far: arrest is
allowed before judgment only if there was fraud in the inducement of the
contract. 4 It would seem that the New Jersey court is more anxious
to punish fraud in such a civil action than to preserve the freedom of its
citizens by a literal interpretation of the statute.
B.
Bulk Sales.
In Mann v. Chrestopulos 5 defendant sold his entire merchandise
in bulk without notifying his creditors of the proposed sale and of the
cost and selling price of this merchandise. A New York statute provided
28. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A :15-42 (Supp. 1956).
29. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. ACT §§ 826 (9), 827.
30. PA. R. Civ. P. 1481.
31. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-42(d) (Supp. 1956).
32. 11 N.J. Misc. 924, 168 At. 832 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
33. Jordan v. Hoffman, 126 N.J.L. 100, 18 A.2d 607 (Sup. Ct. 1941); cf. Polhe-
mus v. Melides, 96 N.J.L. 105, 113 Att. 593 (Sup. Ct. 1921)
34. Macedo Soares, Inc. v. Guertzenstein, 276 App. Div. 155, 93 N.Y.S.2d 222
(1st Dep't 1949).
35. 87 App. Div. 222, 84 N.Y. Supp. 372 (4th Dep't 1903).
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that such a sale "shall be fraudulent and void as against the creditors
of the seller." -6 The plaintiff, who was a creditor of the defendant, caused
defendant's arrest under a statute which allowed a creditor to arrest a debtor
who had disposed of his property with intent to defraud his creditors.
37
The court said the arrest would not be allowed, because there was only
constructive fraud and no actual intent by the defendant to defraud. In a
similar case in New Jersey,38 the court said that noncompliance with the
bulk sales act then in force,39 without more, is no such badge of fraud
as to support an order to hold to bail. Today the New York statute states
that a bulk sale not conforming with its requirements is "void as against
the creditors of the seller" 40 and the New Jersey statute labels the sale as
"voidable",41 without any mention of the sale being fraudulent. It is
certainly clear today that in both states there must, in a bulk sale, be actual
fraud on which to base a civil arrest, since the terms of the statute make
it clear that fraud cannot be implied from non-compliance. In Pennsyl-
vania bulk sales are treated under Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.42  This article does little more than rephrase the former Bulk
Sales Law,4 and the remedies of the creditor are presumably the same,
44
and no arrest is permitted.
C.
Tort and Other Actions Before Judgment.
New Jersey and New York have statutes providing for civil arrest
prior to judgment in tort actions. The New Jersey law allows a capias ad
respondendum when the action is founded upon an outrageous battery or
mayhem, misconduct of a public officer giving rise to a claim for damages,
or a malicious act perpetrated by a non-resident or one about to leave
the state.45 This is very unspecific when compared with the detailed New
York statute which allows the arrest of a defendant in an action brought
to recover damages for an injury to person or property; to recover for
deceit or fraud; to recover a chattel which has been concealed to deprive
plaintiff of the benefit thereof; to recover from a variety of persons in a
position of trust money received, or damages, or property; and to recover
funds or property, owned by a governmental agency, which the defendant
36. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1902, c. 528.
37. N.Y. Con Civ. PROC. § 549 (4), (now N.Y. CIv. PRAC. AcW § 826).
38. Leventon v. Davison, 102 N.J.L. 144, 130 Atl. 632 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925).
39. N.J. Sess. Laws 1915, c. 208, § 1.
40. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 44.
41. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:29-1 (Supp. 1956).
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 6-101 to -111 (Supp. 1956).
43. Pennsylvania Bar Association Notes, Introductory Comment, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12A, Art. 6 (Supp. 1956).
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 6-106, n. 4-8 (Supp. 1956).
45. N.J. STAT. ANN § 2A:15-41 (Supp. 1956).
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has converted.4 6 Pennsylvania does not allow arrest before judgment in
any tort action.47
New Jersey has proved very reluctant to grant" an order of arrest
before judgment in an action for outrageous battery, saying the outrageous
battery mentioned in the statute 48 must be akin to mayhem in order to
justify arrest.4 9  Otherwise, special circumstances must appear before a
capias ad respondendum will be issued.5 0
New York has also hesitated to allow arrest and has proceeded under
the theory that the main purpose of arrest under mesne process is to insure
defendant's presence in obedience to final process.51 In an action to recover
damages for personal injury, extreme acts such as atrocious battery or
mayhem are sufficient basis for an order of arrest. If the defendant's
acts have not been this outrageous, then he will be arrested only if special
circumstances appear,5 2 so that arrest does not become a means of abuse and
oppression.5
As can be seen from the statutes referred to above, there are a number
of other tort actions, in addition to atrocious battery and mayhem, in which
arrest under mesne process will be permitted in New Jersey and'New York.
In an action for false imprisonment, a New York court would have issued
an order of arrest if plaintiff had shown special circumstances justifying
such an order.5 4 The New Jersey statute would seem to permit issuance
of a capias ad respondendum in the same way. 55
In Hand v. Nolan,6 the New Jersey Supreme Court said that a de-
fendant could be held to bail in an action at law for the alienation of the
affections of plaintiff's wife if plaintiff's affidavit showed some special
cause. The case came under section 56 of the Practice Act of 1903,57 but
the statute now in effect is substantially the same in such a situation.58 In
a New York case the defendant was arrested in an action for criminal con-
versation without a showing of any special circumstances.5 9 In an action
for seduction, libel or slander, malicious prosecution, or fraud or deceit,
46. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 826.
47. PA. R. Civ. P. 1481.
48. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-41 (Supp. 1956).
49. Clyde v. Parillo, 25 N.J. Misc. 492, 55 A.2d 810 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
50. Keegan v. Carhart, 106 N.J.L. 30, 147 At. 841 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
51. People ex rel. Wolfe v. Johnson, 230 N.Y. 256, 130 N.E. 286 (1921).
52. Such circumstances are nonresidence of defendant, or a situation indicating
defendant may not be in the jurisdiction when judgment is rendered. Gelles v. Rosen-
baum, 141 Misc. 588, 252 N.Y. Supp. 827 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
53. Gelles v. Rosenbaum, supra note 52. Contra, Morris & Graber, 145 Misc. 465,
261 N.Y. Supp. 260 (N.Y.C. Ct. 1932).
54. N.Y. CiV. PRAC. AcT § 826 (2), Gelles v Rosenbaum, 141 Misc. 588, 252 N.Y.
Supp. 827 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
55. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-41 (Supp. 1956).
56. 1 N.J. Misc. 428, 136 Atl. 430 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
57. N.J. Sess. Laws 1903, p. 551.
58. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-41(c) (Supp. 1956).
59. Von Borstel v. Kranz, 216 App. Div. 392, 215 N.Y. Supp. 241 (2d Dep't
1926).
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it seems that a plaintiff could invoke the New Jersey statute,6° if special
circumstances are present, although no reported cases appear construing
this statute which was enacted in 1951. The section referred to is a catch-all
provision which allows a capias ad respondendum for an action founded
on tort when there is "a willful or malicious act and the defendant is a non-
resident or is about to remove from the state." A plaintiff in New York
could have defendant arrested for seduction, libel or slander, or malicious
prosecution under the Civil Practice Act,6' which allows arrest in an action
brought "to recover damages for a personal injury." Subdivision 5 of the
same statute specifically allows arrest in an action "to recover damages for
fraud or deceit." 62 Although there is no New York statutory requirement
that there be special circumstances justifying the arrest,a the courts' respect
for the statutory right to arrest as a drastic remedy leads them to permit
arrest of the defendant only where it is necessary to protect the interests
of the plaintiff.6
Pennsylvania, along with New Jersey and New York, allows arrest
to recover fines or penalties though no judgment has yet been rendered.6 5
D.
Execution Against the Person After Judgment.
Generally once a judgment has been rendered, a plaintiff may be able
to have defendant arrested under execution process. In New Jersey a
capias ad satisfaciendum will issue on a judgment founded upon contract
where there is an order to hold defendant to bail still in force, or when
proof is given to the court upon which an order to hold to bail could issue
before judgment,66 or when proof is given that defendant has fifty dollars
or more which he wrongfully refuses to apply toward payment of the
judgment against him. 67 When there has been a judgment handed down
in a tort action for injuries to the person or damages to property, and
process to institute that action was in the form of a summons, a capias ad
satisfaciendum will not issue unless defendant's acts causing the injuries
were willful or malicious.68
60. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A :15-41 (Supp. 1956).
61. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 826 (2).
62. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. AcT § 826 (5).
63. Note that N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 826 grants arrest based on certain types of
actions, whereas there is another section, N.Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT § 827, which allows
arrest in an action for specific performance or for separation, i.e.'"in an action wherein
the judgment demanded requires the performance of an act the neglect or refusal to
perform which would be punishable by the court as a contempt. when defendant
is a nonresident of New York or a resident about to depart.
64. See Todd-Buick v. Smith, 118 Misc. 102, 192 N.Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
65. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58-4 (Supp. 1956); N.Y. Civ. Pac. ACT § 826 (1)(Supp. 1956) ; PA. R. Civ. P. 1481.
66 Under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-42 (Supp. 1956).
67. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17-78 (Supp. 1956).
68. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17-79 (Supp. 1956).
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In New York, after judgment has been rendered, execution against
the person of a judgment debtor will be granted to the judgment creditor
where the judgment can be enforced by execution,6 9 and where plaintiff's
right to arrest depends upon the nature of the action.70  An execution
against the person of the judgment debtor will not be granted in New
York until an execution against his property has been returned wholly
or partially unsatisfied.71
A Pennsylvania statute 72 likewise provides that a plaintiff may have
execution upon the personal estate of defendant, and when this is exhausted
upon the real estate of defendant, and if defendant has neither of these,
upon his person. Another statute asserts that no writ of capias ad
satisfaciendum can be executed if defendant has real or personal property
within the county sufficient to satisfy the judgment, 73 nor will it issue for
any sum due on a judgment for less than one hundred dollars. 74 The
enactment abolishing imprisonment for debt also abolishes, with several
exceptions, the capias ad satisfaciendum.75 Under that section the capias
ad satisfaciendum can be used only in tort actions, in actions for fines and
penalties, for moneys collected by a public officer, and for misconduct
or neglect in office or any professional employment.
76
Once we have found a situation in which arrest is permitted, before
or after judgment in New Jersey and New York, and after judgment in
Pennsylvania, we must consider whether the plaintiff is the kind of person
who is entitled to the remedy of arrest. Case law in the three states under
consideration is scant on just what kind of plaintiff may have the defend-
ant arrested. The assignee of a-claim may have such a right in New
York,77 but not in New Jersey.78 A Pennsylvania case states that a cor-
poration in an action for slander is entitled to a ca:pias.79 An old New
69. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 504 provides: "Enforcement of judgment by execution.
In either of the following cases a final judgment may be enforced by execution:
1. Where it is for a sum of money in favor of either party; or directs the pay-
ment of a sum of money.
2. Where it is in favor of the plaintiff in an action of ejectment or for dower.
3. In an action to recover a chattel, where it awards a chattel to either party."
70. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. ACT § 764. New York gives the right to arrest depending
upon the nature of the action (N.Y. Civ. PRAc ACT § 826) or depending partly upon
extrinsic facts (.N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Ac' § 827). See note 63 supra.
71. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 764, Jabitsky v. Solowachik, 150 Misc. 713, 267 N.Y.
Supp. 781 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1934).
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2111 (Supp. 1956).
73. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2142 (Supp. 1956). See Edmonds v. Cooper, 10
Pa. D. & C. 230 (C.P. Phila. 1928).
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2142b (Supp. 1956).
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 257 (Supp. 1956).
76. 2 GOODRICH-AMRAM, CIVIL PRACTICE § 1481(a)-i (issue 42, 1956).
77. King v. Kirby, 28 Barb. 49 (N.Y. 1858).
78. Baker v. Dieterich, 98 N.J.L. 70, 118 Atl. 745 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
79. Temperance Mut. Benefit Ass'n. v. Schweinhard, 3 Pa. C.C. 353 (C.P. Leb.
1887).
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York case says one partner cannot have his copartner arrested,80 and
another holds that the general assignee of a firm on whom a fraud was
committed by defendant may have that defendant arrested.8' This prob-
lem of who is entitled to have an order of arrest does not arise very often,
and the general proposition that the plaintiff, in a civil action,8 2 in which
arrest is authorized by the particular jurisdiction, is entitled to an order
of arrest, will satisfy the greater number of situations.
IV.
PRIVILEGES AND EXEMPTIONS.
A more imminent problem causing difficulty to plaintiffs is whether
the defendant is subject to arrest. A considerable number of privileges
and exemptions has evolved as the result of both statute and case law.
The largest class of privileged persons is the female sex, holders of the
privilege under definitive statutes in all three states. The New Jersey
statute 8 states broadly that no female shall be arrested under "any mesne
process or process of execution in any civil action in any court." 84 In
New York a woman cannot be arrested "except in a case where the order
can be granted only by the court or where it appears that the action is
to recover damages for a willful injury to person, character or property." 85
Pennsylvania's statutes declare that "no female shall be arrested or im-
prisoned for . . . any debt contracted after the passing of this act," 8o
and "no female shall be arrested or imprisoned for any debt . . . nor
for any damages recovered for the breach of contract. . . ." 7 The New
Jersey statute is a blanket provision exempting all women from civil
arrest, whereas New York and Pennsylvania seem to regard civil arrest
as a punitive measure which can be invoked in intentional tort situations
in New York, and in Pennsylvania, in those actions other than debt and
breach of contract, wherein a capias ad satisfaciendum may otherwise
issue.
In New Jersey there is a statutory privilege from civil arrest afforded
idiots and lunatics. 8 New York grants the privilege at the discretion of
80. Smith v. Small, 54 Barb. 223 (N.Y. 1869).
81. Meyer v. Belden, 8 N.Y. Week. Dig. 344 (1879).
82. Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-1 (Supp. 1956). "Every person of full age and
sound mind may prosecute or defend any action in any court, in person or through
another duly admitted to the practice of law in this state."
83. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-40 (Supp. 1956).
84. At least one exception exists, however. See State Bd. of Medical Examiners
v. Brown, 10 N.J. Misc. 998, 161 Atl. 842 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
85. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 829. See N.Y. Civ. PaAc. AcT § 765 concerning execu-
tion against the person of a woman.
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 255 (Supp 1956). This statute only applies to writs
of ne exeat and actions for fines and penalties as a result of PA. R. Civ. P. 1481.
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2142a (Supp. 1956).
88. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:41-1 (Supp. 1956).
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the court,8 9 and Pennsylvania's law granting lunatics the privilege has
been repealed. 9°
New Jersey, in addition, allows exemptions from civil arrest to the
following persons: nonresidents while going to, staying at, or returning
from a judicial proceeding; 9 persons belonging to state military or naval
forces while going to, remaining at, or returning from a place of duty; 92 a
witness before the Waterfront Commission.9 3 By specific statutory pro-
vision in New Jersey a capias ad satisfaciendum cannot issue against a
female, an infant under sixteen, an infant between sixteen and twenty-one
at the court's discretion, a defendant in a fraudulent contract action in
which no fraud was proved, 94 or an insolvent debtor. 95
New York grants exemption from civil arrest to these persons: 6 a
person sued in a representative capacity, except for his own act ;97 a canal
officer; 98 a member of the state militia while going to, remaining at, or
returning from a place of duty; 99 a member or officer of the legislature; 100
a police officer taking a prisoner from one county to another; 101 an officer
of a court of record; 102 a witness ordered to attend an action; 103 policemen
and firemen of second class cities; 104 an insolvent debtor; 105 and an infant
under the age of fourteen. 06
Pennsylvania likewise has its list of exemptions: a person sued in a
representative capacity, unless he has become personally liable; 107 commis-
sioners, registrars, and inspectors of registration; 10s members of the
National Guard in active service; 109 a person obeying a summons to
testify in Pennsylvania or some other state; 110 an attorney in a county
89. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 830.
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 851 (repealed by Pa. Sess. Laws 1951, art. VIII,
§ 801).
91. Michaelson v. Goldfarb, 94 N.J.L. 352, 110 Atl. 710 (Sup. Ct. 1920) ; accord,
Arndt v. Herman, 21 F. Supp. 884 (D.N.J. 1938).
92. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 38:12-2 (Supp. 1956).
93. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:23-100 (Supp. 1956).
94. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17-77 (Supp. 1956).
95. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A :20-10 (Supp. 1956).
96. See Family Finance Corp. v. Starke, 36 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
97. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 831.
98. N.Y. CANAL LAW § 113.
99. N.Y. MIL. LAW § 235.
100. N.Y. LGIS. LAW § 2.
101. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 22; N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 163.
102. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 24.
103. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 25; N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 618-a.
104. N.Y. SIICOND CLASS CiTI s LAW § 139. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 487a-
16.0, 434a-30.0.
105. N.Y. DxaT. & CRED. LAW §§ 100, 120.
106. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. ACT § 830.
107. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 256 (Supp. 1956).
108. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 951-10 (Supp. 1956).
109. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §, 1-842 (Supp. 1956).
110. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 622.4 (Supp. 1956).
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other than that in which he practices; "I a freeholder; 112 suitors and wit-
nesses coming from foreign jurisdictions to attend court; 11a insolvent
debtors." 4
There are several exemptions which have been treated by the courts,
but upon which there is scant authority. A defendant in a criminal action
has no privilege protecting him from civil arrest,"5 but in Pennsylvania
when criminal process has been used to bring a party into the jurisdiction
in order to serve civil process on him it will be set aside as a fraud on
the court." 6 A New Jersey case holds quite logically that a capias ad
respondendum cannot issue against a corporation for fraudulently entering
a contract." 7 However, a partner can be arrested in Pennsylvania under a
capias ad satisfaciendum on a judgment in a suit for injuries caused by
the negligence of the partnership's servants." 8
V.
CONCLUSION.
If the purpose of civil arrest is to keep a person within reach of the
court's final process, it should be granted in cases only where the danger
exists that the defendant is about to leave the jurisdiction. If it is to be
considered as penal, then it should be abolished altogether, for no plaintiff
should have the power to punish another because he claims the defendant
committed an act falling within the statute allowing arrest. The highest
court of New Jersey has declared that the statute allowing a capias ad
respondendum in a contract action has for its purpose the security of the
honest debtor from imprisonment." 9 The implication is that a dishonest
debtor is not entitled to protection from imprisonment, even though the
action is civil, not criminal. In the same case the court says the proof of
the particulars necessary to order the writ must be satisfactory and it must
appear that the judge has exercised his discretion properly. Still, the
legislature should consider whether affidavits or other proof of the aggrieved
plaintiff's claim of fraud, and the fallible discretion of the judicial officer
issuing the writ, are sufficient safeguards for the honest debtor. Even
111. Spencer Heating Co. v. Ricketts, 8 Lack. Jur. 236 (1907).
112. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 251 (Supp. 1956). This statute applies only to
actions for fines and penalties and writs of ne exeat as a result of PA. R. Civ. P. 1481.
113. Baxter v. Conroy, 26 Pa. D. & C. 430 (C.P. Phila. 1917).
114. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 255 (Supp. 1956).
115. Rosenblatt v. Rosenblatt, 110 Misc. 525, 180 N.Y. Supp. 463 (Sup. Ct. 1920);
Crusco v. Strunk Steel Co., 365 Pa. 326, 74 A.2d 142 (1950). But cf. Michaelson v.
Goldfarb, 94 N.J.L. 352, 110 Atl. 710 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
116. Crusco v. Strunk Steel Co., 365 Pa. 326, 74 A.2d 142 (1950).
117. Brune v. Miskind, 11 N.J. Misc. 924, 168 Atl. 832 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
118. Baxter v. Wunder, 89 Pa. Super. 585 (1926).
119. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:27-72 (Supp. 1956), Holmes v. Milligan, 131 N.J.L.
125, 36 A.2d 15 (Sup. Ct. 1943). The present statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:15-42
(Supp. 1956), is substantially the same.
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if the defendant did commit the fraud, does this justify the order of arrest,
or should incarceration be reserved as a punishment in criminal actions
only? Will the arrest be an effective means of preventing the fraudulent
debtor from assigning, concealing, or otherwise disposing of his property?
Is the poor, though fraudulent, debtor to languish in jail because he cannot
post a bond while the more affluent fraudulent debtor, who perhaps has
acquired his wealth from a series of fraudulent transactions, is allowed
to post a bond and go free? Reflecting upon these considerations, it seems
difficult to justify civil arrest before judgment in any contract action.
In tort actions in New York the granting of the remedy of arrest
is left to the sound discretion of the court. °20 The rule appears to be that
defendant will not be arrested in a claim for unliquidated damages, includ-
ing an action for injury to the person, except in cases of mayhem, atrocious
battery, seduction, or similar outrageous and extreme acts, unless special
circumstances appear making it necessary that defendant be restrained
within reach of justice.' 2 ' The New Jersey procedure is essentially the
same. 122 It might be argued that this attitude amounts to a use of arrest
as punishment in cases of "outrageous and extreme acts." However, it
seems that a man who is accused in a civil action of seducing a woman
is much less likely to maintain his assets and his person within the juris-
diction than one who is accused of simple assault and battery, the amount
of damages involved being greatly disparate. If civil arrest is considered
compatible with the juridical system of a freedom-conscious people, then
in cases of such outrageous acts arrest should be permitted, at the same
time giving defendant the right to post a bond in an amount sufficient to
cover the alleged damages. For any less extreme acts, the defendant should
not be arrested unless he is unlikely to be amenable to the court's juris-
diction by reason of his nonresidence or intended imminent departure.
Pennsylvania has taken the lead in abolishing arrest before judg-
ment almost completely. It has still retained arrest before judgment as an
auxiliary remedy in actions for the recovery of fines or penalties (which
are more in the nature of public wrongs), in the seldom-used writ of ne
exeat, and in punishment for contempt. The attitude of this state seems
to be that a man's liberty should not be restrained before a final judg-
ment unless there is a cogent public policy justification. The aggrieved
party may look to the property of the debtor by attachment proceedings,
but the person of the defendant remains at liberty until after judgment
has been rendered.' 28
The question remains, whether a civilized society should permit the
incarceration of a man charged with merely civil liability before he has had
120. Gelles v. Rosenbaum, 141 Misc. 588, 252 N.Y. Supp. 827 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
121. Ibid.
122. Keegan v. Carhart, 106 N.J.L. 30, 147 AtI. 841 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
123. 2 GOODRICH-AMRAM, ST'ANDARD PA. PRAC. 1481(a)-5 (issue 42, 1956).
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a trial on the issue of his liability. In the case of Hernandez v. Aponte,'
124
the plaintiff obtained an order of arrest without notice to the defendant,
who was then imprisoned for two weeks before his application to vacate
the order of arrest came up for a hearing. The plaintiff had been granted
the order of arrest on the grounds that the defendant owed him three
thousand six hundred dollars, that the defendant had removed the
merchandise from his store in bulk with intent to defraud his creditors,
dind that there was danger that defendant would flee the jurisdiction upon
hearing of the affidavits plaintiff had executed. Actually, defendant had
confessed judgment in favor of another creditor, who sold the stock of the
store in execution of his judgment. The affidavits which plaintiff had
presented to the court to obtain the order of arrest were acquired, as it
turned out, under very suspicious circumstances. The defendant had been
placed in jail at a time when he was penniless and unable to post bail. In
his opinion Justice Nunez said:
"If the defendant or anyone else has committed a crime, he should
be prosecuted through our system of penal law and not through the
provisional remedy of arrest. . . . I certainly do not believe in find-
ing a man guilty before he is indicted or, indeed, apprised of any
charge made against him."
After judgment has been entered against the defendant, there are
more convincing reasons for allowing the plaintiff the benefit of execution
against the person. The liability of the defendant for the damages claimed
has been determined in a formal trial. New Jersey's statute allowing such
body execution on a judgment in a contract action when the alleged fraud
or concealment of property has been proved, or when defendant has assets
of more than fifty dollars which he refuses to pay the plaintiff, 125 does not
seem unduly harsh. If the defendant has the assets with which to satisfy
a judgment, a strict sanction should be imposed to coerce him into produc-
ing those assets. A capias ad satisfaciendum cannot be considered a punish-
ment when all defendant has to do to avoid its effect is produce his hidden
assets and satisfy the judgment. In New Jersey a plaintiff with a tort
judgment in his favor is entitled to execution against the person when the
defendant's acts causing the injury to the person or damages to property
were willful or malicious. This is clearly a means of punishment, and
New York's rule allowing execution against the person, in all those situa-
tions in which plaintiff would have the right to arrest based on the nature
of his action 126 is much less discriminatory. 127 As has been seen, Pennsyl-
vania does not permit execution against the person in contract actions at
124. 160 N.Y.S.2d 421 (N.Y.C. Ct. 1957).
125. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A :17-78 (Supp. 1956).
126. See text at footnote 46.
127. Whether or not to grant the execution against the person is at the discretion
of the court, so the scope of the remedy is not as broad as it seems. See Spence v.
Aronson, 43 N.Y.S.2d 958 (Sup. Ct.1943).
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all, but a capias ad satisfaciendum will issue in actions based on tort, fines
and penalties, and misconduct in office.12
8
There does not seem to be any compelling reason why the legislature
should distinguish between judgments in contract actions and those based
on tort. If an amount is due on a judgment of any nature in excess of
some reasonable figure, such as one hundred dollars, and if the defendant
has concealed property or money in excess of perhaps two hundred dollars,
then execution against the person should be permitted to aid the plaintiff
to realize the amount of such judgment. The nebulous advantages of arrest
before judgment are not sufficient to justify its existence, but, after judg-
ment and attempted levy against the defendant's personal and real property,
the plaintiff deserves every reasonable means the law can provide for
satisfaction of that judgment-execution against the person included.
William J. Gobelbecker
128. See text at note 76.
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